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ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE MORAL SOCIETY
Benjamin M. Friedman
*
The premise of economic growth has come under question, in many parts of the world
today, from a variety of directions.  We are aware, of course, that moral thinking in practically
every known culture enjoins us not to place undue emphasis on our material concerns.   But
today there is more to it than that.  With heightened sensitivity to the strains that industrialization
often brings, including the possibility of permanent climate change, many people in the higher-
income countries now question whether further economic expansion is worth the costs.  In the
developing world, where the advantages of rising incomes are more evident, some people
question whether economic growth, and the policies that promote it, are just vehicles for
exploitation by foreigners.  And now that the 2007-? financial crisis has sharply depressed
production and incomes in many countries, both industrialized and not, an unusually large
number of citizens sense that their economies aren’t growing anyway.
A turn away from economic growth is not what anyone should want, however – and not
just on narrowly economic grounds.  The experience of many countries suggests that when a
society experiences rising standards of living, broadly distributed across the population at large,-2-
it is also likely to make progress along a variety of dimensions that are the very essence of what a
free, open, democratic society is all about:  openness of opportunity for economic and social
advancement; tolerance toward recognizably distinct racial, or religious, or ethnic groups within
the society, including new immigrants if the country regularly receives in-migration; a sense of
fairness in the provision made for those in the society who, whether on account of limited
opportunities, or lesser human endowments, or even just poor luck in the labor market, fall too
far below the prevailing public standard of material well-being; genuinely contested elections
that determine who controls the levers of political power; and democratic political rights and
civil liberties more generally.  Conversely, experience also suggests that when a society is
stagnating economically – worse yet, if it is suffering a pervasive decline in living standards – it
is not only likely to make little if any progress in these social, political and (in the 18
th century
sense) moral dimensions; all too often, it will undergo a period of rigidification and
retrenchment, sometimes with catastrophic consequences.
The chief reason so many societies behave in this way stems from the familiar tendency
of most people to evaluate how well off they are not by considering their incomes or living
standards in absolute terms but relative to some benchmark.  More specifically, there is
substantial evidence for two separate benchmarks by which people judge such matters.  Most
people are pleased when they are able to live better than they, or their families, have lived in the
past.  And they are pleased when they are able to live better than their friends, neighbors, co-
workers, and any others with whom they regularly compare themselves.  
The pervasive tendency for people to evaluate their economic situation on these relative
benchmarks, rather than absolutely, explains a variety of familiar features of economic and-3-
psychological behavior that otherwise would be puzzling – for example, the fact that within any
one country, at any given time, people with higher incomes are systematically happier than those
with lower incomes, but there is no corresponding increase over time in how happy people are on
average even though average incomes may be steadily increasing.  As Adam Smith observed
long ago, “all men, sooner or later, accommodate themselves to whatever becomes their
permanent situation,” so that “between one permanent situation and another there [is], with
regard to real happiness, no essential difference.”  Hence the critics of growth who maintain that
higher incomes per se will not make people happier are mostly right.  
But this tendency toward a relative rather than an absolute perspective in such matters
also explains why market economies, as long as they deliver rising living standards to most of a
society’s population, lead more often than not to tolerance, generosity, democracy and many of
the other recognizable features of an open society. The economically self-protective instinct that
underlies racial and religious discrimination, antipathy toward immigration, and lack of
generosity toward the poor naturally takes a back seat to other priorities when people have the
sense that they are getting ahead.
An important consequence is that many countries throughout the developing world
probably will not have to wait until they reach Western levels of per capita income before they
begin to liberalize socially and democratize politically.  If they can manage to grow economically 
(alas, many parts of what we call “the developing world” are not actually developing), and if the
fruits of that growth are shared among their populations, in time liberalization and even some
forms of democratization are likely to follow.-4-
The experience of the Western democracies also makes clear that the connection between
rising living standards and either social attitudes or political institutions is not limited to low-
income countries.  In the United States, for example, eras in which economic expansion has
delivered ongoing material benefits to the majority of the country’s citizens – the decade and a
half following the Civil War, the decade and a half just prior to World War I, the quarter-century
immediately following World War II – have mostly corresponded to eras when opportunities and
freedoms have broadened, political institutions have become more democratic, and the treatment
of society’s unfortunates has become more generous.
By contrast, when incomes have stagnated or declined, reaction and retreat have been the
order of the day.  The rise of Jim Crow laws and the widespread anti-immigrant (and anti-
Catholic and anti-Semitic) agitation of the 1880s and 1890s; the extraordinary appeal of the
reborn Ku Klux Klan, and the adoption of the most discriminatory immigration laws in our
nation’s history (the Emergency Quota Act and then the National Origins Act) during the 1920s;
and the rise of the right-wing “militia” movement, together with a new groundswell of anti-
immigrant sentiment, in the 1980s and early 1990s (before the strong economic growth of the
mid and latter 1990s effectively arrested both), are all familiar examples.   A major exception in
U.S. experience was the depression of the 1930s, which instead led to a significant opening of
American society and strengthening of American democracy – perhaps because the economic
distress of that time was sufficiently widely shared that the sense of being in the same sinking
ship together overwhelmed the more competitive instincts that usually prevail when people
realize they are not getting ahead.-5-
Jews have often been targets of the rise in intolerance that follows when incomes
stagnate.  Many of the most prominent leaders of America’s Populist movement in the 1880s and
1890s were openly anti-Semitic.  Both Ignatius Donnelly, who wrote the Populist Party’s
platform, and William Harvey, who wrote the leading free silver economic tract of the time, also
wrote novels replete with Jewish villains.  (Even Harvey’s best-selling financial tract included a
cartoon with an English octopus, labeled “Rothschilds,” strangling the world.).  Mary Ellen
Lease, the fiery Populist orator who brought the free silver campaign to popular attention, called
President Grover Cleveland an agent of Jewish bankers and British gold.  In the 1920s the
revived Ku Klux Klan was proudly anti-Semitic.  Few Congressmen spoke openly of the
religious bias inherent in the new immigration policies enacted in 1921 and 1924, but the
reflection of the religious map of Europe was plainly evident in the legislation; under the new
laws U.S. immigration from areas from which Jews primarily originated shrank from 700,000 per
year to 20,000.  Although the 1930s ultimately proved a time of broadening of American
democracy, an increasingly strident anti-Semitism was clearly on the rise.  Father Charles
Coughlin drew 40 million listeners to his bigoted weekly rants on the radio, and Charles
Lindbergh’s America First movement likewise enjoyed widespread popular support.  Although
the U.S. Senate confirmed Felix Frankfurter to replace Louis Brandeis on the Supreme Court in
1939, the hearing (far more so than Brandeis’s in 1916, in a different economic climate)
exhibited open anti-Semitism.  Even in the immediate aftermath of Kristallnacht in November
1938, both the public and Congress opposed the idea of admitting 20,000 German Jewish refugee
children.-6-
The United States is hardly the only long-established Western democracy where a
connection between rising living standards and the strengthening of democratic freedoms is
evident.  Other countries’ experience displays similar patterns.  Conversely, many of the
horrifying anti-democratic phenomena that so marred Europe’s 20
th century history ensued in a
setting of pervasive economic stagnation or decline.  Hitler’s rise to power in the wake of the
economic and political chaos of the Weimar Republic is a familiar story, but it is worth recalling
that as late as 1928 the Nazi party drew only 2.8 percent of the vote in German national elections. 
What made the difference, soon thereafter, was the onset of the Great Depression, which affected
Germany more than any other European country.  (Earlier on, what many historians consider the
first major push of modern German anti-Semitism appeared during Germany’s economic
stagnation in the 1870s and 1880s.)  Similarly, France’s Vichy regime, which willingly
collaborated with the Germans – during the war France was one of only two European countries
to turn over to the Nazis Jews from territories that the Germans did not occupy – emerged out of
a protracted period of French economic stagnation during which right-wing nationalist and anti-
Semitic groups like the Action Francaise, Jeunesse Patriots, and the Croix de Feu (“Cross of
Fire”) worked, both behind the scenes and through street violence, to undermine French
democracy.  As my late colleague, the economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, observed
during the war, “even a long democratic history does not necessarily immunize a country from
becoming a ‘democracy without democrats.’ ”   
The connections between economic growth and the democratic character of society need
not be one-directional.  The idea that rising living standards foster tolerance and democracy does
not preclude the parallel notion that these features of society enhance the ability of any economy,-7-
but especially one based primarily on private initiative and decentralized markets, to achieve
superior performance over time.  Different political institutions and different legal frameworks,
as well as different public attitudes and private behavior, help account for why some countries
enjoy more economic success than others.  The evidence is especially strong that effective “rule
of law,” including the protection of property rights, matters for economic growth.  It does not
require an advanced degree in economics to know that barring half of the population from certain
jobs because they are of the “wrong” sex, or still others because they are of the “wrong” race or
“wrong” religion, does not result in the most efficient allocation of an economy’s human
resources.
As a result, a society may find itself in a virtuous circle in which economic growth and
democratic freedoms mutually reinforce one another or, less fortunately, stuck in a vicious circle
in which the stagnation of living standards blunts any movement toward democratic reform while
adverse political institutions and the absence of basic freedoms retard economic improvement for
most citizens.  Leaving aside the periodic ups and downs of market-driven economic growth in
most Western societies, the long-term experience of countries like the United States is a rough
example of the former.  The current plight of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa presents even
sharper examples of the latter.  
Especially in the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many citizens of
countries around the world have sensed that they are not getting ahead.  But importantly, in many
higher-income countries the problem dates to well before the crisis began.  In the United States,
for example, even before the onset of the latest downturn most people had seen little economic
improvement throughout the 2000s.  In 2007 the median family income (the income of families-8-
exactly in the middle of the U.S. income distribution) was $63,700 in today’s dollars.  Back in
2000 the median family income, again in today’s dollars, was $63,400.  The gain – not per
annum, but over the entire seven years – was less than one-half of one percent.  The U.S.
economy as a whole expanded solidly during these years, but the gains from that expanding
production accrued very narrowly, mostly to people already at the top of the scale.  The rest of
the nation’s families saw little improvement.  Although the precise timing differs, the
populations of Italy, France, the U.K., and many other countries as well have experienced
roughly similar income stagnation.
Then came the crisis.  The 2007-? financial crisis and the recession that followed have
constituted one of the most significant sequences of economic dislocations since World War II. 
In many countries (the U.S. included), the real economic costs – costs in terms of reduced
production, lost jobs, shrunken investment, and foregone incomes and profits – exceeded those of
any prior post-war downturn.  Most American families were not immune.  In 2008 the U.S.
median family income fell, to $61,500, a lower level than in any year since 1998.  We do not yet
have the figure for 2009, but it seems clear that last year family incomes dropped again.  Here
too, the pattern is similar in many other countries that have likewise suffered in the financial
crisis and then the economic downturn.  
Nor do we have any solid basis for expecting a rapid recovery of incomes, either in the
U.S. or abroad, now that the worst of the crisis has passed and many of these countries’
economies have started to turn around.  Just now the greatest challenges appear to be in Europe,
where the combination of current monetary institutions and the legacy of past fiscal practices-9-
present what seems to be an insurmountable bar to vigorous recovery.  But near-term growth
prospects in the U.S. are modest as well, and they too are vulnerable to a host of contingencies.
The majority of American families, therefore, have now gone through an entire decade –
or perhaps longer – with no increase in their incomes or improvement in their living standards. 
And unless the economy recovers rapidly, the situation may persist a good while longer.  Past
experience suggests that the consequences of this kind of prolonged stagnation, here as well as in
other countries, will spill over well beyond the realm of economics and business.  The collateral
damage will include our race relations, our religious tolerance, our generosity toward the
disadvantaged (as Adam Smith also wisely observed, “before we can feel much for others, we
must in some measure be at ease ourselves; if our own misery pinches us very severely, we have
no leisure to attend to that of our neighbor”), and the civility of our political discourse.  No
informed citizen can be unaware that the damage, in each of these areas, has already begun to
occur.  Given the country’s historical demographic make-up, the most frequently observed
reaction in such circumstances has been a hardening of attitudes toward new and recent
immigrants, and this too has already begun.  Other countries, presumably with differing specifics,
will probably face similar experiences.  The symptoms often differ from one country to the next,
but the disease of economic stagnation is not a pleasant one anywhere.
The urgent need, therefore, is not merely to get the economy’s production increasing
again, although that is a necessary first step, but to enable the majority of families once again to
earn rising incomes and enjoy improving living standards.  Most citizens, in the United States no
less than elsewhere, have exhibited impressive patience.  It is best not to try that patience too far. 
If a key part of what matters for tolerance and fairness and opportunity, not to mention the-10-
strength of a society’s democratic political institutions, is that the broad cross-section of the
population have a confident sense of getting ahead economically, then no society – no matter
how rich it becomes or how well-formed its institutions may be – is immune from seeing its
basic democratic values at risk whenever the majority of its citizens lose their sense of economic
progress.
The current disillusionment with economic growth – in some quarters, even a fashionable
hostility – reflects a failure to recognize these broader relationships.  But that failure, and the
rejection and hostility to which it gives rise, are, in turn, impediments to restoring both our
economy and our society to a more beneficial (and benevolent) trajectory.  Changing economic
course normally requires policy action.  In a democracy, making policy choices requires public
support.  
The familiar balancing of material positives against moral negatives when we discuss
economic growth is a therefore false choice.  The parallel assumption that how we value material
versus moral concerns neatly maps into whether we should eagerly embrace economic growth or
temper our enthusiasm is wrong as well.  Economic growth bears benefits that are both material
and moral.  As we take up the hard decisions that will inevitably surround any effort to restore
our economy’s vitality in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis and the deepest and most
protracted economic downturn in two generations, it is important that we bear these moral
positives in mind.